Articles
“Have We No Shame? A Moral Exemplar Account of Atonement”, with Meghan D. Page, Faith and Philosophy (Forthcoming)
Abstract: Although Christ’s atoning work on the cross is perhaps the most central tenet of Christianity, understanding precisely how the cross saves remains a theological mystery. We follow the Abelardian tradition and argue that Christ’s death on the cross acts as an example of God’s love for humanity and a means of drawing us back into communion with the triune God. However, our view avoids the standard objection to exemplar views—that they are Pelagian—by introducing an alternative conception of the problem of sin, according to which Christ’s example of God’s love is in fact required for salvation and sanctification.
“Why Animalism Matters”, with Andrew M. Bailey and Peter van Elswyk, Philosophical Studies (2021)
Abstract: Here is a question as intriguing as it is brief: what are we? The animalist’s answer is equal in brevity: we are animals. This stark formulation of the animalist slogan distances it from nearby claims – that we are essentially animals, for example, or that we have purely biological criteria of identity over time. Is the animalist slogan — unburdened by modal or criterial commitments – still interesting, though? Or has it lost its bite? In this article we address such questions by presenting a positive case for the importance of animalism and applying that case to recent critiques.
“The Feeling Animal”, with Andrew M. Bailey, Ergo (2021)
Abstract: For good or for ill, we have animal bodies. Through them, we move around, eat and drink, and do many other things besides. We owe much – perhaps our very lives – to these ever-present animals. But how exactly do we relate to our animals? Are we parts of them, or they of us? Do we and these living animals co-inhere or constitute or coincide? Or what? Animalism answers that we are identical to them. There are many objections to animalism, and a dizzying array of rival views. In this article, we do not propose to evaluate those objections and rivals. We will instead present a new argument for that view. The argument begins with the fact that we have emotions.
“Moral Status and the Architects of Principlism” with Frank Beckwith, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy (2020)
Abstract: In this article, we discuss Beauchamp and Childress’s treatment of the issue of moral status. In particular, we (1) introduce the five different perspectives on moral status that Beauchamp and Childress consider in Principles of Biomedical Ethics and explain their alternative to those perspectives, (2) raise some critical questions about their approach, and (3) offer a different way to think about one of the five theories of moral status (the theory based on human properties) that is more in line with what we believe some of its leading advocates affirm.
“Disembodied Animals”, American Philosophical Quarterly (2019).
Abstract: This paper defends a hylomorphic version of animalism according to which human persons survive as immaterial, bodiless animals after death. According to the hylomorphism under consideration, human persons have souls that survive death, and according to the animalism under consideration, human persons are necessarily animals. One might think this implies that human persons don’t survive their deaths since if they were to survive their deaths, they would be immaterial animals after death, but necessarily animals are material. This paper shows that the hylomorphic animalist can overcome this problem in a way that respects the intuition that animals are material. In addition, the paper defends the hylomorphic animalist survivalist from the objection that her view introduces an insoluble mereological puzzle.
“Varieties of Animalism”, Philosophy Compass (2016).
Abstract: Animalism in its basic form is the view that we are animals. Whether it is a thesis about anything else – like what the conditions of our persistence through time are or whether we’re wholly material things – depends on the facts about the persistence conditions and ontology of animals. Thus, I will argue, there are different varieties of animalism, differing with respect to which other theses are taken in conjunction with animalism in its basic form. The different varieties of animalism vary in credibility: some varieties are supported by arguments that are irrelevant to others, and some varieties are susceptible to objections that others can resist. Adequately distinguishing between varieties of animalism is thus an important preliminary to assessing them. In this paper, I’ll present and argue for a taxonomy of the most distinctive varieties.
Book Reviews
Review of Atonement and the Death of Christ: An Exegetical, Historical, and Philosophical Exploration (William Lane Craig), American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly
Review of Current Controversies in Philosophy of Religion (Paul Draper, ed.), Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2020)
Review of Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity (Stephan Blatti and Paul Snowdon, eds.), Review of Metaphysics (2017).
Review of Libertarian Free Will: Contemporary Debates (David Palmer, ed.), Faith and Philosophy (2016).